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Abstract. The McEliece cryptosystem based on quasi-cyclic moderate-
density parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes is first purposed in 2013[1] and is
considered a promising contender in the post-quantum era. Understand-
ing its security is hence essential. Till now, the most effective attacks
are the reaction attack[2] and the timing attack[3]. Both of these attacks
rely on the decoding performance to recover the private key. The reac-
tion attack relies on the decoding failure rate and the timing attack relies
on the iterations during decoding. However, the mechanics behind these
attacks remain elusive. In this paper, a mathematical model is proposed
to explain both attacks by connecting the spectrum of private key and
first-layer performance of the decoder.
Keywords: post-quantum cryptography, QC-MDCP code, coding the-
ory, timing attack
1 Introduction
Code-based cryptography is first proposed in 1978 by McEliece[4]. In the original
scheme, McEliece exploits Goppa code to store and protect data. The original
scheme remains unbroken in the last forty years and becomes one of the most
promising crypto-systems that can survive under quantum attacks. However, the
original scheme suffers from a large key size. The public key size is the modified
generator matrix of the Goppa code we use. Thus, to transfer a length k message,
we will need a public key size k × n.
In 2013, a new variant of the McEliece system based on QC-MDPC(quasi-
cyclic moderate-density-parity-check code) was proposed[1]. This scheme ex-
ploits QC-MDPC code, instead of Goppa code, to store data. The quasi-cyclic
property can considerably shorten public key size for a given security level, from
O(n×k) to O(n). Moreover, the MDPC property makes this code an inferior ver-
sion of the LDPC code. Therefore, decoding algorithms of LDPC code, usually
the Gallagher algorithm, can be directly applied to the QC-MDPC code.
However, this new scheme brings new security flaws. In 2016, Guo Qian[2]
proposed a reaction attack on this scheme. In 2018, Edward Eaton proposed a
timing attack[3]. Both attacks are based on the feedback of the decoding per-
formance during decryption: Reaction attack is based on failure feedback and
timing attack is based on the number of iterations during decoding through a
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side-channel attack. By collecting a large number of data about the decoding
performance, we are able to recover the private key with a large probability.
The key idea of the Reaction attack[2] and Timing attack[3] is that the private
key can be efficiently recovered from the spectrum of the private key. Moreover,
we find that the reaction performance and timing performance are influenced
by the ”overlap” between the spectrum of the private key and the spectrum of
error. Then, with the knowledge of performance and error, we can recover the
spectrum of the private key and, thus the private key.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we analyze the mechanics behind the two attacks, especially the
timing attack. We at first explain why the two attacks work from a coding theory
perspective. Then, a mathematical framework of these two attacks is built that
can help us understand or estimate the speed of similar attacks.
In sections 3 and 4, we explain why the ”overlap” between the spectrum of
the private key and the spectrum of error can make difference to the performance
of the decoder through connecting the overlapping spectrum to the first layer
performance in the decoder. Moreover, we build a series of linear models to
describe the relationship numerically.
In section 5, we build a math model to explain how to apply the conclusion
in section 3 or 4 to design an attack on the QC-MDPC code crypto-system. Also,
this model can help to estimate the speed of such attack.
2 QC-MDPC McEliece System and Attacks
This section will introduce some basic knowledge. Subsection one will focus on
the QC-MDPC code, its decoding algorithm, and application to McEliece sys-
tem. Subsection two will introduce the reaction attack and timing attack on
QC-MDPC crypto-system.
2.1 QC-MDPC Crypto-system
The QC-MDPC PQC is defined by four parameters [n, k, ω, t], which represents
a class of QC-MDPC codes. The encryption/decryption of QC-MDPC PQC is
based on the encoding/decoding process of this code.
Code Generation The first stage is to generate a QC-MDPC code with the
given parameters. In most practical cases, we assume n = 2k. The process is as
following:
– Generate two vector h0, h1 ∈ Fk2 , each vector is sparse with approximately
ω/2 non-zero term(1’s).
– Generate two k × k matrix H0, H1 by right shifting the vectors h0, h1.For
example, given h0 = [h
1
0, h
2
0, h
3
0, ..., h
k
0 ], the corresponding H0 should be:
2
– Define H = [H0|H1]. This H is the parity-check matrix of our code. All
code-word c ∈ Fn2 belongs to the null space of H as cHT = 0.
– Compute the systematic generator matrix G = [Ik|Q], where Ik is the iden-
tity matrix of dimension k and Q = (H−11 H0)
T . This G represents the null
space of H as mGHT = 0 for all message m ∈ Fk2 .
QC-MDPC Crypto-system encryption and decryption Bob wants to
communicate with Alice with the QC-MDPC cypto-system. He will first generate
the a [n, k, ω, t] code (G,H) based on the above method. Then, he will publicly
announce [n, k, t] and G.
Alice will divide her messages into k-bit pieces m. The encryption process is:
– Generate an error vector e ∈ Fn2 with exactly t non-zero term.
– Ciphertext c = mG+ e.
Then, when Bob received the ciphertext, he will process the decryption pro-
cess:
– Call the decoder of this QC-MDPC code, DH on ciphertext c. The decoder
will return an unpolluted code-word c′ or a symbol of decoding failure.
– If the decoding succeeds, Bob can recover the message m simply by cutting
the first k-bits of c′.
– If the decoding failure, Bob may require a re-transmission or process other
functions.
The decoder may succeed but return an wrong message to Bob. QC-MDPC
code can reduce the probability of returning wrong message by lowering the
value of ω and t. However, lowering ω and t will reduce the security of this
cryptosystem at the same time. We need a trade-off between the performance of
codes and performance of cryto-system. The purposed parameters for different
security level[1]:
Security
Level
n k ω t
80 9602 4801 90 84
128 20326 10163 142 134
256 65542 32771 274 264
Table 1. A table to show the purposed parameters under different security levels
Decoding algorithm for QC-MDPC code The QC-MDPC code has a sim-
ilar structure to the LDPC(low-density-parity-check) code. Therefore, we can
adopt the decoding algorithm of LDPC codes.
The most widely-used algorithm for decoding LDPC codes is the bit-fliping
algorithm. This algorithm will require a vector of threshold b ∈ Zn and the
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parity-check matrix H. This algorithm is an iterative algorithm. In each itera-
tion, the algorithm first computes the syndrome(parity nodes) of the codeword,
s = H ∗ c in F2 field. Then, the algorithm will give each bit a ”score” based
on s and flip all bits whose score is large than the threshold. If the syndrome
s becomes all zeros before the max turn, the decoding is successful; Otherwise,
the decoding fails. The pseudo-code for this algorithms is at Appendix A.
2.2 Timing attack for QC-MDPC systems
The parity-check matrix H can be fully constructed from its first row h = [h0|h1].
Moreover, with the knowledge of generator matrix G, attackers can recover h1
from h0. So, an attack on h0 is sufficient to break this system.
At first, I introduce the concept of the distance spectrum of vectors on F2.
Distance between two nonzero term and Distance spectrum of a vector
Given a vector v ∈ Fn2 where vi, vj = 1, j > i. The distance between vi and vj is:
dist(vi, vj) = min(j − i,
⌊n
2
⌋
− j + i)
Distance spectrum ∆(v) of the vector v ∈ Fn2 is a vector in Z with length
⌊
n
2
⌋
that contain all the distances of v. In detail, ∆(v)k = r if and only if there exists
exactly r distinct pairs of index (i1, j1), (i2, j2), ..., (ir, jr) such that:
dist(vi, vj) = k
By Guo’s paper[2], we have an efficient algorithm to recover the secrete key
h0 from its spectrum ∆(h0). A timing attack will recover the spectrum of h0 by
estimating the average iterations needed to decode codewords of a certain type.
The detailed timing attack algorithm is shown in Appendix A.
This algorithm will return a ratio iterationi/observedi, which converges to
E[iteration|∆(e)i 6= 0]. The timing attack is totally based on an observation
that This E[iteration|∆(e)i 6= 0] has a negative relationship with the spectrum
of secret key ∆(h0)i. In the next two section, I will use a linear model to describe
this relationship and analyze how this result leads us to a successful attack.
3 Causal Relation between the Error and the First-layer
Performance
The timing attack relies on the different performance of the decoder to reveal
the secrete key. Therefore, an understanding of how the decoder reacts to the
different errors can help us analyze the attack. To formulate the problem, con-
sider a QC-MDPC code with the parity-check matrix H = [H0|H1], where
H0, H1 ∈ Fk×k2 are cyclic. I denote the h0, h1 the first rows of H0, H1 and
ω0, ω1 the weight of h0 and h1. In practice, ω0 should be close to ω1. Otherwise,
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this code will be too bad to use. An error e = [e0|e1] with weight t is sent to the
decoder of this code.
I define θ a measure of ”overlaping level” between the spectrum of h0 and
the spectrum of e.
θ = ∆(h0) ∗∆(e) (1)
To characterize the first-layer performance of the decoding of error e, I count
two quantities: ErrGen and ErrCrt. ErrGen is the number of error-less bits that
mistakenly flipped in the first iteration, and ErrCrt is the number of erroneous
bits that successfully corrected in the first layer. I will show how these two
quantity react to θ and influence the final performance of the decoder.
3.1 From Error to ErrCrt
In the first layer, the decoder will flip all the bits connecting to more than
the threshold number of unsatisfied parity-check nodes(the score of this bit).
So, ErrCrt is largely determined by the distribution of score of erroneous bits,
especially the expectation. The relationship between θ and ErrCrt can be derived
from the relation between θ and the expectation of score of an erroneous bit,
Score1.
I assume a linear model between θ and Score1:
Score1 = β ∗ θ + b+  (2)
In practice, we do not care much about the value of b. The value of  is
generally estimated in experiment. The value of β represents the strength of
relation and can be approximate in the following way.
Without any information on errors. Error occurs with uniform probability
on the first half part of codeword. So:
E[Score1] = E[Score(ci)|ei = 1] =
ω0∑
j=1
E[1ji |ei = 1] = ω0
ω0−1∑
m is even
(
t−1
m
)(
k−t
ω0−1−m
)(
k−1
ω0−1
)
(3)
Fig. 1. A figure to the relative position between parity nodes and codewords
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The notation 1ji means the indicator function for event that bit node i sits
on position j of a parity node s, and this s equals 1.
Event A: Given that spectrum of error share a distance d with the
spectrum of h0 . That’s, for a distance d such that ∆(h0)d 6= 0, we know
that ∆(e)d also increase 1. Let {ai}, i ≤ ω0 be the index of non-zero term of h0.
Without loss of generality, we assume that a2 − a1 = d.
E[Score1|A] = E[Socre(ci)|ei = 1, A] = 1
t
t∑
i=1
E[Score(cai)]
=
1
t
t∑
i
ω0∑
j=1
E[1jai ] =
ω0∑
j=1
1
t
t∑
i
E[1jai ].
(4)
Then, we can compute this expectation by elaborating 1t
∑t
i=1E[1
j
ai ] for
different j.This expectation can be calculated under two cases.
– Case1: j = 1 or j = 2:We already know the distance between position 1 and
2 matches the distance between a1 and a2. So, if a1 fall in position 1 or a2
fall in position 2 (each with probability 1t ), we immediately know a2 fall in
position 2 or a1 fall in position 1, respectively. Therefore, the event 1
1
a1 and
event 12a2 is equivalent to that randomly chooses ω0− 2 from k− t zeros and
t−2 ones without replacement, and gets odd number of ones. By symmetry,
the distribution for j = 1 or j = 2 is identical.
E[11a1 ] = E[1
2
a2 ] =
ω0−2∑
m is odd
(
t−1
m
) ∗ ( k−tω0−2−m)(
k−2
ω0−2
) (5)
If a1 does not fall in position 1 or a2 does not fall in position 2, the knowledge
of event A will not give us any useful information. So, the expectation should
not differ from the general cases:
E[11a1 |i 6= 1] = E[12ai |i 6= 2] =
ω0−1∑
m is even
(
t−1
m
) ∗ ( k−tω0−1−m)(
k−1
ω0−1
) (6)
Together, the expectation of Case 1 is:
1
t
E[11ai |i = j] +
t− 1
t
E[11ai |i 6= j] (7)
– Case2: j 6= 1, 2 We need to discuss the value of position 1 and 2 first. The de-
tail process is given in the following figure. The notationHyper(N,K, n, even/odd)
represents the summation of hyper-geometric distribution with parameters
[N,K, n] and all even/odd k.
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Fig. 2. The process to compute the unsatisfied probability of parity-node under case2
This process will give us the expectation under case2 is:
1
k − 1
ω0−3∑
m is even
(
t−3
m
)(
k−t
ω0−3−m
)(
k−3
ω0−3
) +
t− 1
k − 1(
k − t
k − 3
ω0−3∑
m is odd
(
t−2
m
)(
k−t−1
ω0−3−m
)(
k−3
ω0−3
) + t− 2
k − 3
ω0−3∑
m is even
(
t−3
m
)(
k−t
ω0−3−m
)(
k−3
ω0−3
) )+
k − t
k − 1(
k − t− 1
k − 3
ω0−3∑
m is even
(
t−1
m
)(
k−t−2
ω0−3−m
)(
k−3
ω0−3
) + t− 1
k − 3
ω0−3∑
m is odd
(
t−2
m
)(
k−t−1
ω0−3−m
)(
k−3
ω0−3
) )
(8)
From above analysis and my linear model, E[Score1] = β1 ∗ E[θ] + b1 and
E[Score1|A] = β1 ∗ (E[θ|A]) + b = β1 ∗ (E[θ] + 1) + b1. So, the difference
E[Score1|A]−E[Score1] will give us an estimate of the slope around the expec-
tation.
3.2 From Error to ErrGen
This case is more complex than the erroneous case. We want to calculate E[Counter(ci)|ci =
0]. However, in my analysis, all erroneous bits appear in the first half part. But
during decoding, decoder may flip bits in the second half part of codewords.
Luckily, bits in the second half part reacts similarly compared to bits in the first
half so that we can apply our analysis of the first half part directly to the second
half. The detailed proof is in Appendix C.
E[Score0] =
k − t
2k − tEfirst[Score0] +
k
2k − tEsecond[Score0] (9)
Without any information Without any information on the secrete key and
error pattern, we can only regard them as uniformly random vectors each with
weight 0 and t. The indicator event 1
j
i under this case is equivalent to that
randomly chooses 0−1 from k− t−1 zeros and t ones without replacement, and
gets odd number of ones, which follows a hyper-geometric distribution.
Efirst[Score0] =
ω0∑
j=1
Efirst[1
j
i |ei = 0] = ω0
ω0−1∑
m is odd
(
t
m
) ∗ ( k−t−1ω0−1−m)(
k−1
ω0−1
) (10)
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Event A: spectrum of error and spectrum of h0 share a distance d I
assume the distance between position 1 and position 2 is d and {ai, i = 1, , t} be
the index of each bit node that equals one, arranging from smallest to largest,
where a2 − a1 = d.
Efirst[Score0|A] = 1
k − t
k−t∑
i=1
Efirst[Score(ei), i 6∈ a] =
1
k − t
k−t∑
i
ω0∑
j=1
Efirst[1
j
i , i 6∈ a] =
ω0∑
j=1
1
k − t
k−t∑
i
Efirst[1
j
i , i 6∈ a]
(11)
– Case1: j = 1 and j = 2: if j = 1, the position 2 cannot fall to a2 and thus
has less probability to be 1. We need discuss the value of position 2 first.
If position 2 connected to 1 with probability t−1k−2 : The rest will be identical
to the hyper-geometric distribution that draws 0 − 2 from t − 1 ones and
k − t− 1 zeros and sums about even ones.
If position 2 connected to 0 with probability k−t−1k−2 :The rest will be identical
to the hyper-geometric distribution that draws 0−2 from t ones and k−t−2
zeros and sums about odd ones.
Fig. 3. A figure to show the probability distribution of each bits
Consequently, the expectation under case 1 is:
1
k − t
k−t∑
i
Efirst[1
j
i , i 6∈ {a}, j = 1, 2|A]
=
t− 1
k − 2
ω0−2∑
m is even
(
t−1
m
)(
k−t−1
ω0−2−m
)(
k−2
ω0−2−m
) + k − t− 1
k − 2
ω0−1∑
m is odd
(
t
m
)(
k−t−2
ω0−2−m
)(
k−2
ω0−2
) (12)
– Case2: j 6= 1, 2:We need to discuss the choice of position 1 and 2 first. I use
a figure to show my calculation. The Hyper(N,K, n, k),odd/even means a
hyper-geometric distribution of choosing n samples with k successes from
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N − size population with K successful states in population, and calculate
the sum of the probability of odd/even k.
Fig. 4. The process to compute the unsatisfied probability of parity-node under case2
Finally, the expectation under Case2 will be:
1
k − t
k−t∑
i
Efirst[1
j
i , i 6∈ a, j 6= 1, 2|A]
=
t− 1
k − 1 [
t− 2
k − 3
ω0−3∑
m is odd
(
t−2
m
)(
k−t−1
ω0−3−m
)(
k−3
ω0−3
) + k − t− 1
k − 3
ω0−3∑
m is even
(
t−1
m
)(
k−t−2
ω0−3−m
)(
k−3
ω0−3
) ]
+
1
k − 1
ω0−3∑
m is odd
(
t−2
m
)(
k−t−2
ω0−3−m
)(
k−3
ω0−3
)
+
k − t− 1
k − 1 [
t− 1
k − 3
ω0−3∑
m is even
(
t−1
m
)(
k−t−2
ω0−2−m
)(
k−3
ω0−3
) + k − t− 2
k − 3
ω0−3∑
m is odd
(
t
m
)(
k−t−3
ω0−3m
)(
k−3
ω0−3
) ]
(13)
– Final Expectation of Score under Event A: Case1 applied to j = 1 or j = 2,
and Case2 applied to all other ω0 − 2 choices of j. Thus:
Efirst[Score0|A] = 2
k − t
k−t∑
i
Efirst[1
j
i , i 6∈ {a}, j = 1, 2|A]
+
ω0 − 2
k − t
k−t∑
i
Efirst[1
j
i , i 6∈ a, j 6= 1, 2|A]
(14)
Similarly, we assume a linear model between Score0 and θ. By the same analysis
of Event A, we could get: Efirst[Score0] = β0E[θ] + b0 and Efirst[Score0|A] =
β0E[θ|A] + b0 = β0(E[θ] + 1) + b0. An estimate of β0 can be computed by:
Efirst[Score0|A]− Efirst[Score0].
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4 From the first layer to the performance of decoding
In LDPC decoding, the first layer plays a crucial role in the whole decoding pro-
cess. In fact, most errors are corrected in the first three layers. To QC-MDPC
code, the quasi-cyclic property ensures the symmetry among each bit. There-
fore, it would be sufficient to quantify the performance of the first layer by two
parameters: ErrCrt and ErrGen.
In most successful decoding, the first layer corrects a considerable amount of
errors and generate very few errors. In the 90-bits security scheme, our default
decoder can generally correct about 20.463 errors and cause 2.462 new errors by
the default decoder.
However, the performance of decoding is not simply mostly related to ErrCrt-
ErrGen, which is the net errors left after the first layer.
To timing attack, we measure the number of iterations during decoding. The
Iterations has the largest correlation to ErrCrt − 1.6ErrGen. Thats to say,
generating fewer new errors is more important than correcting existing errors in
reducing decoding time.
Fig. 5. Correlation between timing attack and different combination of ErrCrt and
ErrGen
A reasonable explanation for this relationship is that the error generating
rate of the first layer is positively and closely related to the error generating rate
of the following layers. In successful decoding, the new errors need two layers
to complete a whole circle: one layer to generate, and one layer to eliminate.
This assumption helps explain the near 1:2 ratio of Error Correction and Error
Generation. Therefore, we could utilize this linear relationship to explain the
timing attack.
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5 An explanation to the timing attack algorithm
From above analysis, we get δ = tmaxErrCrt− (1− tmax)ErrGen maximizing
the correlation between δ and iterations during decoding. Then, we assume a
linear model between δ and iterations:
Iteration = βδ + b+  = β(tmaxErrCrt− (1− t)ErrGen) + b+  (15)
δ, in a sense, represents the error-correcting ability of the first layer. Thus,
it is believed to have a positive β. Since ErrCrt and ErrGen are linearly related
to θ, Iteration is also linearly related to θ.
Iteration = β′θ + b′ + ′ (16)
So, this β′ is negative since the relationship between θ and δ is negative.
During the timing attack, attackers have access to the spectrum of error, ∆(e),
and iterations to decode this error. Assuming that we are attacking the first
position of secrete key ∆(h0)1. Recall the definition of θ.
Iteration = β′(∆(e)1∆(h0)1 +
∑
rest
∆(e)i∆(h0)i) + b+ 
′
= β′∆(h0)1∆(e)1 + β′
∑
rest
∆(e)i∆(h0)i + b+ 
′ (17)
In the timing attack algorithm on distance 1, the program will record the
number of errors whose first distance is not zeros. Mathematically, the program
will return:
MaxTurn∑
i=1
1∆(ei)1
The 1∆(ei)1 is the indicator function of ∆(ei)1, the first term in the distance
spectrum of the i-th error.
Also, the program will sum up the number of iterations in decoding errors
which has a nonzero first term in their distance spectrum. In math, this quantity
is:
MaxTurn∑
i=1
Iterationi1∆(ei)1 =
MaxTurn∑
i=1
[β′∆(h0)1∆(ei)11∆(ei)1
+β′
∑
rest
∆(ei)j∆(h0)j1∆(ei)1 + b1∆(ei)1 + 1∆(ei)1 ]
(18)
We evaluate the first term when MaxTurn −→∞:
MaxTurn∑
i=1
β′∆(h0)1∆(ei)11∆(ei)1 −→ β′∆(h0)1E[∆(e)1|∆(e)1 6= 0]
MaxTurn∑
i=1
1∆(ei)1
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When MaxTurn −→ ∞, we expect ∑MaxTurni=1 1∆(ei)1 −→ ∞. Therefore, by
our assumption of independence among ∆(e)j , we can evaluate the second term
to:
MaxTurn∑
i=1
β′
∑
rest
∆(ei)j∆(h0)j1∆(ei)1 −→ β′
∑
rest
E[∆(e)j ]∆(h0)j
MaxTurn∑
i=1
1∆(ei)1
The rest two terms will also converge to:
MaxTurn∑
i=1
(b+ )1∆(ei)1 −→ b
MaxTurn∑
i=1
1∆(ei)1
Together, the program output is:
∑MaxTurn
i=1 Iterationi1∆(ei)1∑MaxTurn
i=1 1∆(ei)1
−→ β′∆(h0)1E[∆(e)1|∆(e)1 6= 0] + β′
∑
rest
E[∆(e)j ]∆(h0)j + b
= β′(E[∆(e)1|∆(e)1 6= 0]−E[∆(e)1])∆(h0)1 + β′
∑
all
E[∆(e)j ]∆(h0)j + b
(19)
Also, the relationship among ∆(h0) is:∑
all
∆(h0)j =
(
ω0
2
)
Therefore, the program output will cluster into several levels which totally de-
pends on the ∆(h0)1 and the gap is:
β′(E[∆(h0)1|∆(h0)1 6= 0]−E[∆(h0)j ])
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Appendix A: Some Important Algorithms
Algorithm 1 QC-MDPC Decoding
Input Codeword c, Parity-check matrix H, Threshold b, Max Iteration M
Output Purified Codeword m or failure symbol ⊥
1: s← H ∗ c′ in F2
2: i← 0
3: while (s 6= 0) ∧ (i < M) do
4: i← i+ 1
5: c← c+ (counter > b[i]) in F2
6: end while
7: if s=0 then
8: return m← c
9: else
10: return ⊥
11: end if
Algorithm 2 Timing Attack
Output Purified Codeword m or failure symbol ⊥
1: Generates an error e = [e0|e1], e0, e1 ∈ Fk2 , where e1 = 0, wt(e0) = t
2: Compute the spectrum of the error ∆(e)
3: Send e to target (Here the codeword c = 0)
4: n← number of iterations (from side channel)
5: for each i, ∆(e)i 6= 0 do
6: observedi+ = 1
7: iterationi+ = n
8: end for
9: return iterationi/observedi for i ∈ {1, 2, ...,
⌊
k
2
⌋}
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Appendix B: Experiment results for section 3.1
We do experiments on 90-bit security crypto-system scheme with decoder thresh-
old [30,28,26,25,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23,23]. A random secret key [h0, h1]
with 0 = 1 is generated and 50000 errors are tested on this key. In 90-bit security
system, the estimate slope β1 is:−0.001153.
Fig. 6. a plot of theta vs Score1 based on 50000 trials on a 90-bit system and a pre-
determined decoder. The red line is the regression line.
We can see the actual slope given by this experiment is −0.001159. This value
is very close to our estimate value.
The first layer will correct an error if it has a counter value larger than (equal
to) the threshold, which is 30 in this case. The counter value of an erroneous
bit does not has a notable distribution. However, since the threshold is close to
its expectation, the relation between the expectation and the error correction in
first layer is relatively strong.
Fig. 7. a plot of Score1 vs ErrCrt based on 50000 trials on a 90-bit system and a
pre-determined decoder. An obvious linear relation can be observed.
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Appendix C: Applying the result in section 3.2 to second
half part of the codeword
All bits in the second half part are errorless, thus has no influence on the parity
nodes. Also, we have no information on the secret key h1. Thus, bits in the
second half part is randomly connected to ω1 parity nodes. All parity nodes are
symmetric thus has a same probability to be unsatisfied (but not necessarily
independent). Then,
Esecond[Score0] = ω1Pr(s = 1) = ω1
wt(s)
k
(20)
every unsatisfied parity node will increase the total score in the first half by
exactly ω0. So:
(k − t)Efirst[Score0] + tE[Score1] = ω0wt(s) (21)
The crypto-system requires k − t >> t:
wt(s) ≈ k − t
ω0
Efirst[Score0] (22)
Thus:
Esecond[Score0] ≈ ω1(k − t)
ω0k
Efirst[Score0] (23)
A good QC-MDPC crypto-system will require ω0 ≈ ω1. Otherwise, the de-
coder of this QC-MDPC code will be inefficient. Therefore,
E[Score0] ≈ Esecond[Score0] ≈ Efirst[Score0] (24)
The conclusion on Efirst[Score0] can be applied to E[Score0].
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Appendix D: Experiment results for section 3.2
From the above analysis, the slope between Score0 and θ for 90-bit security
is predicted to be -0.003979. The experiment result described in the previous
section gives us a slope of -0.004172.
Fig. 8. The linear relationship between θ and the average Score0
When we have a close look up of the distribution of Score0. It generally
follows a normal distribution.
Fig. 9. A figure to show the distribution of Score0
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New errors are generated in first layer if the score of an errorless bit exceeds
the threshold of the decoder, which is 30 in our test. It is obvious that an decrease
in the expectation of score will result in a decrease in the false flip, ErrGen.
Fig. 10. the plot of Score0 vs ErrGen
From the above figure, These two variables have a positive relationship. More-
over, the left side has a clear linear relationship. This observation provides that a
low average Score1 ensures a low new error generation rate, but high expectation
does not necessarily result in high error generation rate.
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Appendix E: Experiment results for section 5
It’s difficult to conduct experiment on iteration directly because the slope β′ is
usually determined by experiment. But, we can test on the linear relationship
between Score0 and ∆(h0)1. Similarly,∑MaxTurn
i=1 (Score0)i1∆(ei)1∑MaxTurn
i=1 1∆(ei)1
−→ β0∆(h0)1E[∆(e)1|∆(e)1 6= 0] + β0
∑
rest
E[∆(e)j ]∆(h0)j + b
(25)
As discussed in section 3, on 90-bits security protocol, the value of β0 is predicted
to be −0.003979. The value of (E[∆(h0)1|∆(h0)1 6= 0] − E[∆(h0)j ]) can be
easily determined both experimentally and theoretical. On 90-bits protocol, it is
about 0.4293. So, the clustering gap is predicted to be −0.003979 ∗ 0.429140 =
−0.001708.
Fig. 11. An attack on Score0 based on 50000 trials. We can see a clear linear relation-
ship.
Then, an attack on Score0 based on 50000 trials is performed. The gap is
about −0.001744, which is very close to my prediction.
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